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THE RIGHT OF MINORITY-REFUGEES TO PRESERVE THEIR 
CULTURAL IDENTITY: AN INTERSECTIONAL ANALYSIS 
 
 




International human rights law (IHRL) has been accused of locking individuals into rigid 
categories on the basis of their presumed primary identity, and of predetermining their 
needs on the basis of a standardised experience. IHRL, therefore, fails to appreciate how 
the location of individuals at the intersection of different social categories makes their 
experience of oppression distinct from the experience of those seen as typifying each 
category. Specifically, while UN treaty bodies have sought to address forms of oppression 
resulting from the intersection of gender, race and/or disability through their practice, 
they rarely recognise the experience of groups at the intersection of other social 
categories. 
 
This article uses the lens of intersectionality to analyse the practice of UN treaty bodies 
in relation to the intersection of minority and refugee status. We argue that while 
minority-refugees have fled persecution connected to their minority status, UN treaty 
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bodies have failed to appreciate the impact of their location at the intersection of persons 
belonging to minorities and refugees in host States on their right to preserve their cultural 
identity. By failing to address the distinct experience of minority-refugees, UN treaty 
bodies risk participating in their oppression. Further, we reveal that current practice not 
only has potentially negative consequences for minority-refugees —as both individuals 
and groups— and for the host society but may even undermine the ability of IHRL to 
achieve its overarching objectives. 
 
Consequently, UN treaty bodies must recognise how the location of individuals at the 
intersection of social categories beyond race, gender and/or disability results in a distinct 




International human rights law (IHRL) should, in theory, be ‘indivisible, interdependent 
and interrelated’,1 insofar as the enjoyment of one set of rights is recognised to be 
necessary for the effective enjoyment of all others.2 However, critical theorists argue that, 
in practice, IHRL fails to achieve this as it locks individuals into rigid categories —as, 
for example, refugees or women— on the basis of their presumed primary identity,3 and 
predetermines their needs on the basis of a standardised experience.4 Thus, IHRL fails to 
appreciate how the location of individuals at the intersection of different social categories, 
                                                 
1 UNGA, ‘Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action’ UN Doc A/CONF.157/24 (Part I) [5]. 
2 James W. Nickel, ‘Rethinking Indivisibility: Towards a Theory of Supporting Relations between Human 
Rights’ (2008) 30 Human Rights Quarterly 984. 
3 Roger Zetter, ‘Labelling Refugees: Forming and Transforming a Bureaucratic Identity’ (1991) 4 Journal 
of Refugee Studies 40; Wendy Brown, ‘Suffering the Paradoxes of Rights’ in Wendy Brown and Janet 
Halley (eds), Left Legalism/Left Critique (Duke University Press 2002). 
4 Zetter (n 3) 44; Wendy Brown, ‘“The Most We Can Hope For...”: Human Rights and the Politics of 
Fatalism’ (2004) 103 The South Atlantic Quarterly 451, 460. 




experience different forms of oppression as compared to those seen as typifying each 
category.5 In so doing, IHRL further marginalises the experience of these individuals and, 
even risks contributing to their oppression,6 when, on the contrary, it is supposed to 
recognise and combat such oppression.  
 
Intersectionality theory informs this article’s analysis of UN treaty bodies’ current 
practice in relation to minority-refugees. Intersectionality as a theory challenges the 
tendency to capture individuals’ experiences based on a single classification, for example, 
gender or ethnicity.7 Instead, it demonstrates how ‘the structural and dynamic 
consequences of the interaction between two or more axes of subordination’,8 result in a 
qualitatively different experience of oppression.9 Intersectionality is most commonly used 
to highlight forms of oppression resulting from the intersection of gender, race and/or 
class.10 This has, notably, influenced the development of IHRL,11 and led to the 
recognition of the qualitatively different experience of individuals at this intersection by 
UN treaty bodies,12 albeit inconsistently.13 Further, the interaction between disability and 
                                                 
5 Johanna E. Bond, ‘International Intersectionality: A Theoretical and Pragmatic Exploration of Women’s 
International Human Rights Violations (2003) 52 Emory Law Journal 71, 80. See generally, Kimberlé 
Crenshaw, ‘Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of 
Color’ (1991) 43 Stanford Law Review 1241. 
6 Crenshaw (n 5) 1245; Patrick R. Grzanka, ‘Systems of Oppression’ in Patrick R. Grzanka (ed) 
Intersectionality: A Foundations and Frontiers Reader (1st edn, Routledge 2018) 2.  
7 Crenshaw (n 5) 1242-44. 
8 Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, ‘The Structural and Political Dimensions of Intersectional Oppression’ in 
Grzanka (n 6) 17.  
9 Crenshaw (n 5) 1245. 
10 See, for example, Kimberlé Crenshaw, ‘Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black 
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics’ [1989] 
University of Chicago Legal Forum 139; Crenshaw (n 5). 
11 Patricia Hill Collins and Sirma Bilge, Intersectionality (Polity Press 2016) 70-76.  
12 Shreya Atrey, Intersectional Discrimination (OUP 2019) 18-19; Pok Yin S. Chow, ‘Has Intersectionality 
Reached its Limits? Intersectionality in the UN Human Rights Treaty Body Practice and the Issue of 
Ambivalence’ (2016) 16 Human Rights Law Review 453, 454.  
13 Shreya Atrey, ‘Fifty Years On: The Curious Case of Intersectional Discrimination in the ICCPR’ (2017) 
35 Nordic Journal of Human Rights 220.  




other social categories has been recognised under the UN Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities.14 However, UN treaty bodies rarely recognise the experience 
of groups at the intersection of other social categories. Thus, this article uses the lens of 
intersectionality to analyse the practice of UN treaty bodies in relation to the hitherto 
unexplored intersection of minority and refugee status. In so doing, it reveals that UN 
treaty bodies must expand their practice beyond the traditional intersection of race, gender 
and/or disability. Failure to do so has potentially negative implications that extend further 
than impacted individuals and may even undermine the objectives of IHRL.  
 
We understand minority-refugees to be individuals recognised as belonging to ethnic, 
religious or linguistic minorities in their home State in accordance with Article 27 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),15 who do not have a kin-
State and have sought refuge as a result of persecution connected to their minority 
identity.16 Their distinct experience is a direct result of their classification as persons 
belonging to minorities and as refugees.  
 
For illustrative purposes, this article draws on the experiences of Dom, Kurdish and 
Yazidi minority-refugees, who have fled persecution in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic 
since 2014, as they have been subjected to both recent —during the ongoing humanitarian 
crises— and historical persecution on the basis of their minority identity. However, the 
conclusions drawn may be equally applicable to other groups located at the minority-
                                                 
14 United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (opened for signature 30 March 
2007, entered into force 3 May 2008) 2515 UNTS 3. See, Atrey (n 12) 18.  
15 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted on 16 December 1966, entered into force 
23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR). 
16 As we are concerned with the practice of UN treaty bodies, we do not consider the formal recognition 
of such groups as ‘refugees’ in their host State, in accordance with Article 1(A)(2) of the Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 
137 (UN Refugee Convention); Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 31 January 1967, 
entered into force 4 October 1967) 606 UNTS 267.  




refugee intersection. While individual minority-refugees may also belong to other social 
categories, such as gender, and, as a result, experience oppression differently to other 
minority-refugees, this falls outside the scope of this article.  
 
This article draws on scholarship from the fields of social psychology and acculturation 
studies, in order to provide unique insights in relation to the impact of intersectionality 
on minority-refugees’ experience of oppression in host States and the implications of 
current UN treaty body practice. The majority of this literature pertains to single-identity 
categories such as immigrants, refugees and ethno-cultural minorities, rather than 
intersectional categories such as minority-refugees.17 Nonetheless, this literature 
facilitates the identification of a range of phenomena, relevant to the experience of 
minority-refugees in host States. Literature that focuses specifically on minority-refugees, 
demonstrates how their distinct experience exacerbates these phenomena and results in a 
qualitatively different experiences in host States as compared to both autochthonous 
minorities and other refugees.18  
 
We argue for the explicit recognition of the distinct experience and, therefore, needs of 
minority-refugees by UN treaty bodies. Currently, UN treaty bodies neglect the right of 
minority-refugees to preserve their cultural identity (hereinafter ‘right to cultural 
                                                 
17 See, for example, Jan Pieter van Oudenhoven, Colleen Ward and Anne-Marie Masgoret, ‘Patterns of 
Relations between Immigrants and Host Societies’ (2006) 30 International Journal of Intercultural 
Relations 637; Jenny Phillimore, ‘Refugees, Acculturation Strategies, Stress and Integration’ (2011) 40 
Journal of Social Policy 575; Michaela Hynie, ‘Refugee Integration: Research and Policy’ (2018) 24 
Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 265. 
18 See, for example, Marina Taloyan and others, ‘Acculturation Strategies in Migration Stress Among 
Kurdish Men in Sweden: A Narrative Approach’ (2011) 5 American Journal of Men’s Health 198; Nabi 
Fatahi and Øyvind Økland, ‘Difficulties and Possibilities in Kurdish Refugees’ Social Relationship and 
its Impact on their Psychosocial Well-Being’ (2015) 2 Journal of Family Medicine & Community Health 
1; Sami Richa and others, ‘Trauma Exposure and the PTSD prevalence among Yazidi, Christian and 
Muslim Asylum Seekers and Refugees Displaced to Iraqi Kurdistan’ (2020) 15 Plos One 1, 8. 




identity’) because they fail to appreciate the significance of minority-refugees’ location 
at the intersection of persons belonging to minorities and refugees.19 This has potentially 
negative consequences, for minority-refugees —as both individuals and groups— and for 
the host society. The current state of affairs is not only counterintuitive, insofar as 
minority-refugees have fled persecution in their home State in order to be able to maintain 
their cultural identity but also has the potential to undermine the objectives of IHRL and 
International Minority Rights Law (IMRL), namely: the protection of human dignity; the 
preservation and continued existence of minority identities; and social stability and 
cohesion.  
 
Thus, section two, informed by structural intersectionality, reveals how minority-
refugees’ experience of oppression in the host State is qualitatively different to that of 
individuals classified as either persons belonging to minorities or refugees. Section three 
turns to political intersectionality and explores the failure to recognise and address 
minority-refugees’ experience of intersectional oppression by UN treaty bodies. Finally, 
section four analyses the implications of the current practice of UN treaty bodies for 
minority-refugees —as both individuals and groups— and for the host society. This 
allows us to identify key recommendations that would allow UN treaty bodies to respond 
to the intersectional experience of minority-refugees in the future.  
 
2. THE INTERSECTIONAL EXPERIENCE OF MINORITY-REFUGEES IN 
HOST STATES  
 
This section draws on structural intersectionality to demonstrate that whilst minority-
refugees suffer similar patterns of oppression associated with other refugees and persons 
                                                 
19 This article focuses specifically on the practice of UN treaty bodies and, as a result, does not consider 
the right of minority-refugees to cultural identity under other frameworks.  




belonging to minorities, they also experience forms of oppression that are distinct and 
intersectional in nature. Crenshaw uses structural intersectionality to refer to ‘the ways in 
which the location of women of color at the intersection of race and gender makes our 
actual experience of domestic violence, rape, and remedial reform qualitatively different 
than that of white women’.20 Similarly, this section argues that the distinct oppression 
that minority-refugees experience in host States results from the way the disadvantages 
suffered by refugees intersects with their experience as persons belonging to minorities. 
Most notably, minority-refugees’ location at the intersection of these two categories 
impacts their ability to maintain their cultural identity in host States.  
Minority-refugees —specifically, Dom, Kurdish and Yazidi refugees who have fled from 
Syria and Iraq since 2014— were persons belonging to minorities prior to becoming 
refugees. As a result of their minority-status, the minority-refugees considered here have 
been widely acknowledged to have suffered both historical and more recent persecution 
in their home State. The Kurdish minority in the Syrian Arab Republic has been subject 
to historical discrimination and forced assimilation, including: the deprivation of 
citizenship;21 and restrictions on the use of their mother tongue22 and the celebration of 
cultural holidays.23 Similarly, the ethnic identity and lifestyle of Dom people in Syria has 
led them to experience discrimination and marginalisation because they are viewed as 
having a lower social and moral status.24 Yazidis in Iraq have suffered persecution 
                                                 
20 Crenshaw (n 5) 1245. 
21 Human Rights Watch, ‘Group Denial Repression of Kurdish Political and Cultural Rights in Syria’ 
(Human Rights Watch, November 2009) 11, 22 
<www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/syria1109web_0.pdf>.  
22 ibid 11, 22.  
23 ibid.  
24 Yesim Yaprak Yildiz, ‘Nowhere to Turn, The Situation of Dom Refugees from Syria in Turkey’ 
(European Roma Rights Centre, September 2015) 9, 16 
<https://research.gold.ac.uk/id/eprint/27569/1/Nowhere-to-Turn_Syrian%20Dom%20Refugees.pdf>. 




throughout their history owing to their beliefs.25 More recently, they have been victims 
of genocidal attacks, including killings, forced conversion from Yazidism to Islam, and 
the removal of Yazidi children from their families and placement of these children with 
members of the ‘Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’ (ISIS).26  
The systematic persecution and denial of the human rights of these groups in their home 
States has subsequently led minority-refugees to seek refuge. There are an estimated 
800,000-1,500,000 dispersed Yazidis worldwide.27 As a result of the humanitarian crisis 
starting in 2014, approximately 60 percent of the Yazidi population from Iraq is currently 
displaced.28 Similarly, of 250,000-300,000 Doms from the Syrian Arab Republic, 
approximately 150,000 are now dispersed amongst Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon as 
refugees.29 Within Europe, significant numbers of minority-refugees have been granted 
refugee status in Germany and Greece.30  
                                                 
25 Human Rights Watch, On Vulnerable Ground–Violence Against Minority Communities in Nineveh 
Province’s Disputed Territories (Human Rights Watch, 2009) 
<www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq1109web.pdf>. 
26 UN Human Rights Council, ‘They Came to Destroy: ISIS Crimes Against Yazidis’ (15 June 2016) UN 
Doc A/HRC/32/CRP.2. 
27 Kristine Kolstad, ‘5 Things You Should Know about the Yezidis’ (Norwegian Refugee Council, 10 
December 2018) <www.nrc.no/news/2018/december/five-things-you-should-know-about-the-yazidis/>.  
28 Minority Rights Group, ‘Iraq Yazidis’ <minorityrights.org/minorities/yezidis/> accessed 23 May 2020. 
29 Kirkayak Kultur Dom Research Center, ‘The Dom, the “Other” Asylum Seekers from Syria 
Discrimination, Isolation and Social Exclusion: Syrian Dom Asylum Seekers in the Crossfire’ (Kirkayak 
Kultur) 19 <www.stgm.org.tr/sites/default/files/2020-09/the-dom-the-other-asylum-seekers-from-syria-
discrimination-isolation-and-social-exclusion-syrian-dom-asylum-seekers-in-the-crossfire.pdf>. 
30 Benjamin Bathke, ‘Yazidi refugees in Germany suffer severely from 2014 genocide, study says’ 
(InfoMigrants website, 31 July 2019) <www.infomigrants.net/en/post/18508/yazidi-refugees-in-germany-
suffer-severely-from-2014-genocide-study-says>; Olga Bronshteyn and Todd Finklestone, ‘Yazidi 
Refugees in Greece-Unaccompanied Minors Brief’ (One Track International, 25 October 2018) 
<onetrackinternational.org/yazidi-refugees-in-greece-unaccompanied-minors-brief/>; InfoMigrants, 
‘Kurdish refugees to lose rights for staying away from Moria’ (Info Migrants, 05 June 2018) 
<www.infomigrants.net/en/post/9688/kurdish-refugees-to-lose-rights-for-staying-away-from-moria>. 




Minority-refugees are disadvantaged by the intersection between the systems of 
oppression that minorities and refugees face in host States. Many refugees experience 
cultural bereavement as a result of the loss of familiar cultural practices, languages, 
religious customs, and difficulties associated with adjustment to a new culture in host 
States.31 Whilst this cultural bereavement, for refugees, is largely the consequence of 
physical displacement, for minority-refugees this is compounded by the destruction of 
their cultural sites in their home States. It has been reported that many sacred shrines and 
temples that play a central role in the religious identity of the Yazidi community in Iraq, 
have been damaged and destroyed by the members of ISIS.32 The specific cultural 
bereavement experienced by minority-refugees, due to the combination of forced 
displacement with the destruction of their culture, also makes their experience of post 
migration stress in host States qualitatively different from other refugees. They suffer 
from guilty feelings related to cultural loss, which results in a higher level of emotional 
distress and disruption of their daily life in host States, as compared to other refugees.33 
For example, both Yazidi and Kurdish refugees have expressed feelings of guilt as a 
consequence of losing their identity and their separation from their territories.34 Kurdish 
refugees have also found that the ability to contribute to the maintenance of their own 
culture, both in their home State and the host State, has helped them to cope with this 
trauma.35 These examples illustrate that minority-refugees experience of cultural 
bereavement is qualitatively different to that of other refugees. 
                                                 
31 Hyojin Im and Jonah Neff, ‘Spiral Loss of Culture: Cultural Trauma and Bereavement of Bhutanese 
Refugee Elders’ (2020) Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies 1, 3. 
32 Benjamin Isakhan and Sofya Shahab, ‘The Islamic State’s Destruction of Yezidi Heritage: Responses, 
Resilience and Reconstruction After Genocide’ (2020) 20 Journal of Social Archaeology 3, 12. 
33 Richa and others (n 18) 8; Taloyan and others (n 18) 202. 
34 ibid.  
35 Taloyan and others (n 18) 202.  




The victimisation encountered by minority-refugees in host States further demonstrates 
the intersectional nature of the oppression that they face. Whilst refugees who belonged 
to the majority in their home State may be subject to harassment in the host society,36 
minority-refugees have been victimised by other refugees as well as the host society. For 
example, Yazidi refugees have been attacked, and their tents and belongings have been 
destroyed by other refugees in the Skaramagas refugee camp in Greece.37 Similarly, due 
to their minority status combined with their refugee status, Dom refugees in Turkey have 
been targets of harassment, discrimination and exclusion both inside and outside of the 
refugee camps.38 As a result, some prefer to settle with autochthonous Doms/Romas in 
their traditional areas.39 However, their tents are frequently raided by Turkish government 
officers.40  
This demonstrates that the victimisation of minority-refugees is dynamic; they are 
targeted because they are refugees, whilst their experience as Yazidis or Doms renders 
them acutely vulnerable to religious and ethnic prejudice. This, potentially, could lead 
                                                 
36 Veronique Barbelet and Caitlin Wake, ‘The Lives and Livelihoods of Syrian Refugees in Turkey and 
Jordan’ (Humanitaran Policy Group, February 2017) 3, 13 
<https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/11344.pdf>.  
37 Canadian Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, ‘Distress Call: How Canada’s 
Immigration Program Can Respond to Reach the Displaced and Most Vulnerable’ (42nd Parliament, 1st 
Session, October 2016) 53. 
38 Development Workshop, ‘Dom Migrants from Syria Living at the Bottom on the Road amid Poverty and 
Discrimination’ (The Asylum Information Database website, November 2016) 
<www.asylumineurope.org/sites/default/files/resources/2016.11developmentworkshopreportdomlivingatt
hebottom.pdf >; Kate Maltby, ‘Bordering Isolation: Attitudes to Minorities in Turkey’ (2014) 43 Index on 
Censorship 62, 62. 
39 Development Workshop (n 38) 71.  
40 Yildiz (n 24) 10. 




them to hide their cultural identities, further hindering their ability to preserve them in 
host States.41 
Minority-refugees’ preservation of their cultural identity may also be disrupted by 
assimilation policies. Their ability to maintain their cultural identities has already been 
obstructed in their home States by assimilation policies that aim to destroy these identities 
or have a comparable destructive effect. This is compounded when host States adopt 
assimilation policies. For example, Turkey, a major minority-refugee receiving State, has 
sought to assimilate the autochthonous Kurdish minority by oppressing the Kurdish 
language through the prohibition of its use in public places, education, press and 
broadcasting.42 They also gave Kurdish villages Turkish names.43 Similarly, the 
autochthonous Dom minority in Jordan and Lebanon has been subjected to forced 
assimilation policies.44 Further, host States have adopted dispersal policies that 
purposefully separate culturally similar refugees in the name of ‘integration’.45 By 
reducing the opportunities for members of refugee groups to interact with one another, 
                                                 
41 Sophie Chamas, ‘Among Syrian Refugees, hidden Dom suffer war and rejection’ (Thomson Reuters 
Foundation News, 30 October 2014) <https://news.trust.org/item/20141030170457-sm9xp>. 
42 Tove Skutnabb-Kangas and Sertaç Bucak, ‘Killing a Mother Tongue-How Kurds are Deprived of 
Linguistic Human Rights’ in Tove Skutnabb-Kangas and Robert Phillipson (eds), Linguistic Human Rights: 
Overcoming Linguistic Discrimination (Mouton de Gruyter 1995) 347-71. 
43 Welat Zeydanlıoğlu, ‘Turkey's Kurdish Language Policy’ (2012) International Journal of the Sociology 
of Language 99, 109. 
44 HRC, ‘Concluding observations on the initial report of Turkey’ (13 November 2012) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/TUR/CO/I [9]; CERD, ‘Concluding observations on the combined eighteenth to twentieth 
periodic reports of Jordan’ (26 December 2017) UN Doc CERD/C/JOR/CO/18-20 [24]-[25]; CESCR, 
‘Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Lebanon’ (24 October 2016) UN Doc 
E/C.12/LBN/CO/2 [64].  
45 OECD, ‘Making Integration Work: Refugees and Others in Need of Protection’ (OECD, 2016) 22-30 
<www.oecd.org/migration/making-integration-work-humanitarian-migrants-9789264251236-en.htm>; 
European Commission, ‘Moving on? Dispersal Policy, Onward Migration and Integration of Refugees in 
the UK’ (European Commission, 31 December 2015) <ec.europa.eu/migrant-
integration/librarydoc/moving-on-dispersal-policy-onward-migration-and-integration-of-refugees-in-the-
uk>. 




dispersal policies weaken their cultural bond and, thereby, hamper the maintenance of 
their cultural identity.46 Assimilation policies are not limited to minority-refugees, 
however, due to their ‘co-existing and co-constitutive’47 identities, the effect of these 
policies on minority-refugees’ ability to maintain their cultural identity is compounded. 
Thus, their experience is qualitatively different to that of both minorities and refugees 
who belonged to the majority in their home State. Given that minority-refugees, 
particularly Dom and Yazidis, are already small in number and currently displaced from 
their traditional areas, these policies not only make the preservation of cultural identity 
particularly difficult on an individual level, but also threaten the survival of the group.  
Therefore, the patterns of oppression that minority-refugees suffer as a result of belonging 
to refugee groups in host States cannot be defined in isolation from the oppression they 
suffered as a result of belonging to minorities in their home States. Their oppression as 
minority-refugees is both distinct and produced as a result of the overlap between their 
different identity categories.  
 
3. MINORITY-REFUGEES AND INTERSECTIONALITY UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
 
As identified, in the previous section, the structural intersectional oppression faced by 
minority-refugees on the basis of their ‘overlapping identity categories’48 specifically 
impairs their ability to preserve their cultural identity, in a way that is both similar to and 
different from autochthonous minorities and other refugees in the host State. It is vital 
                                                 
46 Phillimore (n 17) 589. 
47 Atrey (n 12) 43. 
48 Sumi Cho, Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw and Leslie McCall, ‘Intersectionality: Theorizing Power, 
Empowering Theory’ (2013) 38 Signs 785, 797. 




that the IHRL framework recognises the ways in which minority-refugees’ identities 
interact and result in a distinct experience in order to prevent the marginalisation of these 
groups. This section explores the extent to which UN human rights treaties (IHRL 
treaties), and their treaty bodies have recognised the needs of minority-refugees as 
persons belonging to minorities, refugees and as persons belonging to both of these 
categories simultaneously, specifically in relation to the right to cultural identity.  
 
It is argued that the recognition of the intersectional oppression experienced by minority-
refugees is not precluded by the structure of IHRL treaties. Instead, political factors 
converge in the practice of UN treaty bodies and lead this intersectional oppression to be 
overlooked. In so doing, this section draws on the Concluding Observations of UN treaty 
bodies in relation to States that received significant numbers of minority-refugees 
following the 2014 humanitarian crises, namely, Germany, Greece, Jordan, Lebanon and 
Turkey. To date, UN treaty bodies have not been given the opportunity to consider 
communications on this issue.  
 
Within intersectionality literature, the IHRL framework has been critiqued for 
contributing ‘to a fractured understanding of the nature of discrimination’ because it 
categorises groups along ‘a single-axis of social division’,49 such as sexism or racism, 
through the development of targeted treaties such as CEDAW and ICERD.50 Thus, Skeet 
observes ‘[t]here is a tendency […] to view a classic recipient in the terms of the most 
privileged members of these groups and to see them as operating separately rather than 
                                                 
49 Collins and Bilge (n 11) 2. 
50 Bond (n 5) 93. See also, Aisha Nicole Davis, ‘Intersectionality and International Law: Recognizing 
Complex Identities on the Global Stage’ (2015) 28 Harvard Human Rights Journal 206, 206.  




being viewed as intertwined or complementary protections’.51 This structural issue 
precludes UN treaty bodies from fully addressing intersectionality. However, in direct 
contrast to the categories of gender and race, the IHRL treaty framework does not 
automatically categorise minority status and refugee status along a single-axis. This is 
because, no UN human rights treaties are dedicated exclusively to the rights of refugees 
nor to persons belonging to minorities.52 Notably, while the Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (UN Refugee Convention) as amended by the 1967 Protocol Relating 
to the Status of Refugees extends basic rights to the category of refugees, this treaty does 
not fall within the UN human rights machinery and does not have a dedicated treaty body 
tasked with monitoring compliance.53 Instead, under IHRL, rights violations suffered by 
both refugees and persons belonging to minorities are primarily addressed under the same 
three treaties, namely the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)54 and the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(ICERD).55 As a result, there are no structural impediments to the consideration of 
                                                 
51 Charlotte Helen Skeet, ‘Intersectionality as Theory and Method: Human rights adjudication by the 
European Court of Human Rights’ in Naomi Creutzfeldt, Mark Mason and Kirsten McConnachie (eds) The 
Routledge Handbook of Socio-legal Theory and Method (Routledge 2019) 278. 
52 Nb. ICERD is sometimes argued to be a de facto minority rights instrument. This discussion falls outside 
the scope of this article. See further, David Keane and Joshua Castellino, ‘Is the International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination the De Facto Minority Rights Treaty?’ in Carla 
Buckley, Alice Donald and Philip Leach (eds), Towards Convergence in International Human Rights Law: 
Approaches of Regional and International Systems (Brill 2016).  
53 While the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) supervises the implementation of the UN 
Refugee Convention, it does not have a transparent State reporting process and neither is it able to receive 
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intersectional rights violations experienced by minority-refugees, by the treaty bodies 
tasked with monitoring these treaties.  
 
However, in their practice, UN treaty bodies have primarily constructed minority-
refugees as refugees and not as persons belonging to minorities. In practice, this 
classification, directly influences the rights minority-refugees are recognised to have. The 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), the Committee on Racial 
Discrimination (CERD) and the Human Rights Committee (HRC) have all addressed the 
rights of refugees under a broad range of provisions in their respective treaties in 
Concluding Observations on major minority-refugee receiving States. However, they 
tend to focus on issues that impact all refugees such as refoulement,56 reception 
conditions,57 discrimination,58 access to education,59 and health care.60 Many of the rights 
addressed by UN treaty bodies mirror the protection offered under the UN Refugee 
Convention.61 We do not dispute that the recognition of these basic rights is of the utmost 
importance for minority-refugees. However, the construction of a ‘category’ such as 
refugees as a homogenous group, runs the risk of ‘render[ing] invisible experiences of the 
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more marginal members of that specific social category’.62 UN treaty bodies do not fall 
into this trap entirely, as they do occasionally recognise the specific needs of women and 
child refugees.63 Yet, they do construct refugees as a homogenous ethnic/cultural group 
by addressing refugees as a coherent whole and this obscures the additional forms 
oppression experienced by minority-refugees. 
 
This is particularly apparent when it comes to minority-refugees’ right to cultural identity, 
the foundation of minority rights protection.64 The ICCPR, ICERD and ICESCR all 
contain rights that are directly relevant to the preservation of minority identity. Article 27 
ICCPR specifically establishes a right for persons belonging to ethnic, religious or 
linguistic minorities ‘to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, 
or to use their own language’. Further, Article 5(e)vi ICERD establishes a right to 
participate in cultural activities without discrimination ‘based on race, colour, descent, or 
national or ethnic origin’.65 Notably, while both of these rights have a limited scope of 
application, they apply to persons who are ethnically different from the majority and are, 
thus, of specific relevance to persons belonging to minorities. In contrast, Article 15(1) 
ICESCR sets out a ‘the right of everyone: (a) To take part in cultural life’ and has been 
interpreted to encompass a right to cultural identity.66 
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However, UN treaty bodies’ Concluding Observations in respect of these rights have 
tended to focus on specific autochthonous minorities within State parties, such as the 
Muslim minority in Thrace, Greece,67 the Dom and Bedouin minorities in Lebanon68 and 
the Dom/Roma minorities in Jordan.69 Even the CESCR tends to view the scope of the 
right to cultural identity through the prism of minority rights,70 despite the fact Article 
15(1) ICESCR is applicable to ‘everyone’. This is not to suggest that minority-refugees 
are directly excluded from this right, rather they are not expressly recognised as 
rightsholders.  
 
Vague pronouncements have been made by all three treaty bodies in relation to the right 
to cultural identity that could be read to extend to minority-refugees. For example, they 
have all encouraged Greece to broaden its definition of ‘ethnic minorities’ and, thereby, 
ensure that ‘all minorities’ are able to benefit from the right to preserve their culture.71 
Further, CESCR has required that States ensure migrants, asylum seekers and refugees’ 
‘enjoyment of their economic, social and cultural rights’.72 Whereas, in General Comment 
No. 23 on ‘the rights of minorities’, the HRC explained, more generally: ‘Just as they 
need not be nationals or citizens, they need not be permanent residents. Thus, migrant 
workers or even visitors in a State party constituting such minorities are entitled not to be 
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denied the exercise of those rights’.73 Yet, only on one occasion, shortly after the adoption 
of General Comment No. 23 and prior to the humanitarian crisis, did the HRC recommend 
that a State extend the scope of application of Article 27 ICCPR to those granted asylum.74  
 
Consequently, all three treaty bodies have recognised the relevance of the right to cultural 
identity to ‘ethnic minorities’ generally and have not limited its scope of application to 
autochthonous minorities. Yet, they rarely explicitly recognise that it is applicable to 
‘newcomers’ to the State and they do not specify which ‘ethnic minorities’ require 
attention. By referring to autochthonous minorities by name and treating the broader 
category of ‘ethnic minorities’ as a homogenous group, UN treaty bodies suggest that all 
non-autochthonous minorities have an identical experience and, therefore, identical 
needs. Yet, as recognised in the previous section, minority-refugees not only have a 
qualitatively different experience to autochthonous minorities but also to refugees who 
belonged to the majority in their home State. As a result, they require specific attention 
from UN treaty bodies.  
 
Further, under the current approach, there is a risk that minority-refugees will be excluded 
from the right to cultural identity entirely, because they are not recognised as persons 
belonging to minorities. There is no agreed definition of ‘minority’ under IHRL, despite 
several attempts to capture one.75 Notably, these attempted definitions tend to be narrow 
and establish requirements such as nationality or citizenship,76 both of which exclude 
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minority-refugees. States have similarly sought to limit their obligations in relation to the 
right of persons belonging to minorities to cultural identity. The drafters of Article 27 
ICCPR envisioned that its scope of application would be interpreted narrowly to exclude 
migrants and other ‘new minorities’, who were instead expected to assimilate into their 
new society.77 This approach persists and several major refugee receiving States, namely, 
Greece, Germany and Turkey, that have historically sought to limit their obligations under 
Article 27 ICCPR through the adoption of narrow, exclusionary definitions.78 Thus, 
States may not read vague pronouncements concerning the right of ‘ethnic minorities’ to 
cultural identity as encompassing minority-refugees.  
 
The UN treaty bodies have not explicitly recognised intersectional rights violations 
experienced by minority-refugees. However, this cannot be attributed to a lack of 
awareness as they have explicitly addressed the persecution of minority-refugees in their 
home States, in their Concluding Observations. For example, they have expressed 
concern at the persecution of the Yazidis by ISIS in Iraq79 and, specifically, recognised 
the right of Yazidis to cultural identity and cultural heritage.80 Further, the HRC has urged 
the Syrian government to ensure that all members of the Kurdish minority are able to 
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enjoy their own culture and use their own language.81 In contrast, persons belonging to 
Dom minorities have not been explicitly named in Concluding Observations concerning 
Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic. However, they are captured by generic statements that 
express concern about ‘ethnic or religious minorities’82 and minorities with ‘non-Arab 
heritage’.83 Yet, as soon as members of these groups cross an international border to 
escape this persecution, the categorisation of minority-refugees as refugees shifts the 
focus of UN treaty bodies away from these previously recognised rights. The neglect of 
minority-refugees’ cultural identity under IHRL obscures their interests and has the 
potential to compound their oppression.  
 
The current approach of UN treaty bodies is also counterintuitive in instances where 
minority-refugees have fled to a host State where the same minority already exists and is 
subject to persecution. For example, UN treaty bodies have expressed concern at the 
persecution of the autochthonous Dom minority in Jordan and Lebanon and Kurdish 
minority in Turkey.84 In instances where Dom or Kurdish minority-refugees’ have fled to 
these States, their experience of persecution in their home State is likely to be 
compounded by the threat of persecution in the host State, as well as the burden of refugee 
status. In these cases, any distinction between the rights of old and new members of the 
same group is potentially arbitrary, and also fails to recognise the potential for minority-
refugees to experience persecution in the host State.  
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While the UN human rights treaty framework does not categorise persons belonging to 
minorities and refugees in a way that precludes the recognition of intersectional rights 
violations, the practice of UN treaty bodies does. This suggests that the failure to prioritise 
the oppression of minority-refugees by treaty bodies, is political, rather than structural. 
Political intersectionality ‘focusses on the failure to recognise or prioritise oppression or 
aspects of the oppression of a subject by one or more equality-seeking groups’.85 Within 
UN treaty bodies, the failure to recognise the intersectional oppression experienced by 
minority-refugees potentially has multiple causes.  
 
UN treaty bodies have broad mandates, and, therefore, cannot directly address every 
human rights violation occurring within a State. As previously established, a number of 
major minority-refugee receiving States do not respect the basic rights of refugees, nor 
the right of autochthonous minorities to cultural identity. Thus, the right of minority-
refugees to cultural identity may simply not be a priority for UN treaty bodies.  
 
They are also reliant on the interventions of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), in 
order to identify the most pressing issues within States.86 As has been observed in 
intersectional scholarship more broadly, the strategies adopted by single-issue political 
actors, such as NGOs, tend to prioritise the experience of dominant members of a group 
and marginalise those with intersectional experiences of oppression.87 This is no different 
in the UN, where NGO Shadow Reports to the UN treaty bodies in relation to major 
refugee receiving States following the humanitarian crisis have focused on the ‘universal’ 
experience of refugees and have, thus, prioritised violations of basic refugee rights, such 
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as the principle of non-refoulement.88 Consequently, the priorities of the actors within the 
system may have led to the neglect of minority-refugees’ right to cultural identity. 
 
UN treaty bodies may also be reticent to address minority-refugees’ right to cultural 
identity in their Concluding Observations because this is likely to be a politically 
controversial proposition. Notably, States were initially reluctant to accept obligations in 
relation to persons belonging to minorities and refugees and, as a result, sought to reserve 
a right to assimilate newcomers during the drafting processes of both Article 27 ICCPR89 
and the UN Refugee Convention.90 Many refugee receiving States are not only resistant 
to the extension of Article 27 ICCPR to newer groups91 but continue to adopt assimilation 
policies in relation to autochthonous minorities, for example, by prohibiting the use of 
minority languages.92 As assimilation demands culture shedding,93 it is inherently 
incompatible with the right to cultural identity and has been discredited under both the 
IHRL and international refugee law frameworks.94 Nonetheless, UN treaty body 
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recommendations that expressly recognise minority-refugees’ right to cultural identity 
have the potential to be unpopular and distract from other priorities, such as the 
recognition of basic refugee rights. Thus, UN treaty bodies’ failure to address minority-
refugees’ right to cultural identity may simply be a political calculation.  
 
While it is possible for UN treaty bodies to recognise the intersectional nature of the 
oppression experienced by minority-refugees, they have not done so in practice. Notably, 
the neglect of minority-refugees’ right to cultural identity, appears to be a result of 
political priorities within UN treaty monitoring system rather than structural factors. 
However, the current practice of UN treaty bodies has the potential to exacerbate the 
oppression experienced by these minority-refugees. As warned by Crenshaw, 
‘[i]ntersectional subordination need not be intentionally produced; in fact, it is frequently 
the consequence of the imposition of one burden that interacts with preexisting 
vulnerabilities to create yet another dimension of disempowerment’.95 Specifically, by 
not explicitly recognising and addressing minority-refugees’ right to cultural identity, UN 
treaty bodies run the risk of legitimising the adoption of assimilation policies by host 
States.  
 
4. THE IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT UN TREATY BODY PRACTICE 
 
The failure of UN treaty bodies to expressly recognise minority-refugees’ right to cultural 
identity has the potential to legitimise the adoption of assimilation policies by host States. 
Significantly, this is not just a theoretical problem. In practice, some host States continue 
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to adopt policies of forced assimilation in relation to autochthonous members of the same 
minorities. Other States adopt policies that have an assimilatory effect. For example, 
dispersal policies may prevent refugees from settling with culturally similar groups within 
States,96 whereas, EU safe third country policies97 may prevent minority-refugees from 
relocating to States where a sizable community already exists. Both policies undermine 
the creation of the cultural resources needed to facilitate the preservation of minority-
refugees’ culture when they are dislocated from their land and community.98  
 
More generally, refugee integration policies at a national, European and international 
level have been accused of conflating integration and assimilation.99 In contrast to 
assimilation policies that require culture shedding, integration policies emphasise the 
mutual adaptation of both the dominant group and non-dominant groups100 and, therefore, 
respect minority-refugees’ right to cultural identity.101 However, refugee ‘integration’ 
policies tend to place the onus of adaptation on to refugees and neglect the role of the 
majority in the ‘two-way process’ of integration.102  
 
This section argues that the adoption of assimilation policies by host States has negative 
implications for minority-refugees —both individually and as a group— and for the host-
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society. This also undermines the ability of IHRL and IMRL to achieve their core 
objectives: the protection of human dignity;103 the preservation and continued existence 
of minority identities;104 and social stability and cohesion.105 UN treaty bodies must not 
only address minority-refugees’ right to cultural identity in their monitoring practice, but 
they must also respond to the intersectional experience of these groups.  
 
4.1. HUMAN DIGNITY AND THE RECOGNITION OF MINORITY-REFUGEES’ RIGHT 
TO PRESERVE THEIR CULTURAL IDENTITY 
 
By legitimising assimilation policies, the neglect of individual minority-refugees’ right to 
cultural identity by UN treaty bodies has the potential to endanger their dignity. As Raz 
suggests ‘[r]especting human dignity entails treating [individuals] as persons capable of 
planning and plotting their future’.106 Assimilation policies undermine minority-refugees’ 
dignity, by hampering their ability to participate in the host society and limiting their 
options. The challenges faced by individual minority-refugees in this respect are likely to 
be further exacerbated by their pre-migration experience. As human dignity is one of the 
one of the aims of IHRL,107 UN treaty bodies should recognise minority-refugees’ right 
to cultural identity by explicitly prohibiting forced assimilation policies, as well as 
policies that have an assimilatory effect in practice.  
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Assimilation policies, by requiring culture shedding, deprive minority-refugees of 
choices upon which they base their conception of the good life, and thus have the potential 
to undermine their dignity. Respect for human dignity requires that individuals can 
choose and revise rational life plans; although society may provide some options, access 
to your own culture is central to ‘the successful pursuit of worth-while goals and 
relationships’.108 This is because culture provides individuals with meaningful options 
and thus influences how they choose to live their lives.109 The close relationship between 
the protection of culture and dignity has also been recognised by the CESCR: ‘the 
protection of cultural diversity is an ethical imperative, inseparable from respect for 
human dignity’.110 However, assimilation policies limit minority-refugees’ choices to the 
options offered by the host State’s culture/s. This restricts their ability to make 
autonomous and meaningful choices and, therefore, impairs their dignity. These policies 
are likely to endanger minority-refugees’ dignity to a greater extent than other refugees, 
because minority-refugees have been subject to oppression and prevented from making 
meaningful choices about their lives in their home States. This combines with 
assimilation policies in host States to further limit individual minority-refugees’ freedom 
to choose their life plans. 
Although there is no universally agreed definition of what human dignity means, 
Clapham maintains that human dignity requires the creation and protection of ‘the 
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conditions for everyone’s self-fulfilment (or autonomy or self-realization)’.111 For 
minority-refugees, self-realisation requires their successful adaptation and, thus, 
participation in the host society. However, assimilation policies undermine the ability of 
refugees to adapt to host States and are more likely to result in marginalisation or 
separation.112 As acknowledged by Raz, ‘the demand for a forced retraining and 
adaptation is liable to undermine people's dignity and self-respect [...] It shows that the 
state […] has no respect for their culture, finds it inferior and plots its elimination’.113 
Specifically, assimilation policies aggravate the oppression experienced by minority-
refugees in their home State, and, thus, have the potential to undermine their ability to 
adapt by exacerbating prior psychological trauma and causing ‘acculturative stress’.114 A 
study focusing on Kurdish refugees in Norway and Sweden has demonstrated that their 
experience in their home States has made it difficult for those refugees to form a 
‘satisfactory relationship with [their] new societies’.115 Further, where Kurdish refugees 
have suffered from discrimination as ethnic minorities in their home States, this 
experience led them to misconstrue unpleasant behaviour faced in host societies as 
discriminatory.116 Consequently, assimilation policies have the potential to undermine the 
ability of individual minority-refugees’ to participate in the host society more than other 
refugees.  
As assimilation policies impede the realisation of one of the main objectives of IHRL, the 
protection of human dignity, it is important that UN treaty bodies explicitly acknowledge 
that individual minority-refugees have the right to cultural identity and, accordingly, 
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prohibit the adoption of both forced assimilation policies and those policies that have an 
assimilatory effect by host States.  
 
4.2. THE PRESERVATION AND CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF MINORITY-
REFUGEES’ CULTURAL IDENTITY 
 
The failure of UN treaty bodies to address minority-refugees’ right to cultural identity in 
host States has the potential to not only exacerbate historical persecution but also result 
in the complete destruction of the group. This risk is compounded when persons 
belonging to the same minorities continue to be subject to persecution in their home State. 
Thus, a negative interpretation of the scope of the right to cultural identity, that simply 
prohibits forced assimilation is insufficient to ensure the preservation and continued 
existence of minority-refugees’ cultural identities. UN treaty bodies must recognise that 
host States have a positive obligation to ensure the continued existence of minority-
refugees’ cultures, in light of the distinct obstacles they face.  
Significantly, the preservation and continued existence of minority identities is one of the 
primary objectives of IMRL.117 Article 1(1) of the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Persons Belonging to Ethnic or National, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (UNDM) 
establishes that States are under an obligation to ‘protect the existence and the national or 
ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity of minorities within their respective 
territories’. The Commentary to the UNDM, further, elaborates that existence should be 
understood to extend beyond physical existence to ‘respect for and protection of their 
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religious and cultural heritage, essential to their group identity’.118 However, the current 
approach of UN treaty bodies has the potential to undermine this objective.  
As a result of intersectional oppression, the culture of minority-refugees is particularly 
susceptible to elimination. As previously discussed, minority-refugees have frequently 
been subject to historical persecution and forced assimilation in their home States, as well 
as acts of both physical and ‘cultural’ genocide, such as the destruction of religious or 
cultural sites, by ISIS. While minority-refugees have fled persecution linked to their 
identity, they face further obstacles to the preservation of their cultural identities in host 
States that adopt assimilation policies and, thus, demand culture shedding. Groups such 
as the Dom and Yazidis, who were already small in number, may not have a sufficient 
critical mass to guarantee the continued existence of their culture. Thus, their treatment 
in host States is central to the continued existence of their culture. Even Kurdish minority-
refugees, who are numerically much larger than the Dom and Yazidis, recognise the need 
to proactively ‘protect their identity’ in host States.119 Significantly, as minority-refugees 
cannot rely on the support of kin-States and are unlikely to return home120 they are to 
some extent dependent upon the measures adopted by host States to facilitate the 
preservation of their culture. Thus, the recognition that minority-refugees continue to hold 
the right to cultural identity in host States is central to the continued existence of their 
culture.  
Most notably, the dispersal of minority-refugees, either amongst different host States or 
within the same host States,121 poses barriers to the continued existence of their culture. 
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In both instances, dispersal obstructs the preservation of the aspects of minority-refugees’ 
culture that would usually be practiced in community with others. However, it also 
prevents minority-refugees from establishing cultural resources, such as cultural centres, 
places of worship or language provision, that could enable the preservation of their 
cultural identity.122 By reducing the opportunities for members of these groups to interact 
with one another, dispersal policies also weaken minority-refugees’ cultural bond.123 For 
these groups, dispersal policies may align more closely with policies of forced 
assimilation that are prima facie incompatible with the right to cultural identity and, most 
notably, have been prohibited under IMRL.124  
Consequently, if UN treaty bodies are to avoid the elimination of the culture of minority-
refugees then they must encourage States to adopt policies that actively counter 
assimilation. Both the HRC and CESCR have interpreted Article 27 ICCPR and Article 
15(1)(a) ICESCR, respectively, to give rise to positive obligations.125 In relation to 
minority-refugees, UN treaties bodies could suggest that States not only refrain from 
applying dispersal policies to minority-refugees, but that they also take active steps to 
ensure that they are able to settle in the same area, should they so wish.126 In cases where 
numerically small minorities are dispersed amongst different host States, States could be 
encouraged to override ‘safe third country’ policies, to allow minority-refugees to settle 
together. Although not ideal, in instances where it is not feasible for minority-refugees to 
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settle together, UN treaty bodies could urge host States to actively facilitate transnational 
networks, as these are proven to facilitate contact and the maintenance of refugees’ 
cultural identities.127 Similarly, minority media may also positively influence the 
preservation of minority-refugees’ cultural identity,128 when dispersed amongst different 
host States. 
While UN treaty bodies have expressed concern about the destruction of minority-
refugees’ cultures in their home States, the attribution of ‘refugee status’ to minority-
refugees shifts the focus of UN treaty bodies away from ensuring the continued existence 
of these cultures. Yet, the intersectional experience of minority-refugees in host States 
places their culture at additional risk of disappearing. Measures to counteract the 
disappearance of minority-refugee’s culture are vital not only for the continued existence 
of the group but also, as previously established, the dignity of individual minority-
refugees. If these cultures are to be preserved, in accordance with the raison d’être of 
IMRL, UN treaty bodies must not only recognise minority-refugees’ right to cultural 
identity, but that host States have a positive obligation to facilitate this. 
 
4.3. THE SOCIAL STABILITY AND COHESION OF HOST STATES  
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The failure of UN treaty bodies to recognise minority-refugees’ right to cultural identity 
also has negative implications for the host State’s society. Assimilation policies tend to 
require culture shedding and, in so doing, focus on the adaptation of newcomers to the 
State but not the adaptation of the host society. Significantly, such policies have the 
potential to exacerbate the intergroup anxiety of minority-refugees and the host society 
alike and, thus, undermine social cohesion.129 IMRL recognises this mutually reinforcing 
relationship between ‘the promotion and protection of the rights of persons belonging to 
national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities’, on the one hand, and ‘the political 
and social stability of States in which they live’, on the other.130 Indeed, security and 
stability have been identified as one the main aims of IMRL.131 In order to realise this 
aim, UN treaty bodies must encourage States to adopt acculturation policies that respect 
minority-refugees’ right to cultural identity, alongside policies to promote tolerance of 
diversity and social cohesion in the host society. 
 
The preference for assimilation policies that demand culture shedding in host States is 
frequently driven by the majority’s fear that refugees ‘will reject local beliefs and 
customs, and thus bring about changes in cherished values and norms’.132 However, Esses 
and others have demonstrated that the majority’s sense of threat is exacerbated if 
newcomers do not comply with assimilation policies.133 This even has the potential to 
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result in increased demands for culture shedding.134 Thus, the perceived willingness of 
newcomers to adapt to the host society directly correlates with the majority’s perception 
of threat. However, assimilation policies have the potential to be counterproductive. As 
discussed, above, the rejection of their culture by the host society has the potential to 
undermine the ability of minority-refugees to adapt.135 It may also lead them to identify 
even more strongly with their own culture136 and lead to social marginalisation or 
separation.137  
 
In contrast to assimilation policies, integration policies that respect newcomers’ right to 
cultural identity have been shown to reduce the majority’s sense of threat because 
newcomers find it easier to comply with the demands of the host society.138 As minority-
refugees are even more reluctant to give up their cultural identity, as a result of their 
experience of historical persecution,139 they are more likely to be able to comply with 
integration policies than assimilation policies. Significantly, social psychologists have 
also demonstrated that integration policies are associated with much better outcomes for 
both host societies and non-dominant groups than assimilation policies.140 Consequently, 
were UN treaty bodies to require that ‘integration’ policies respect the right of minority-
refugees to preserve their cultural identity in their Concluding Observations, this is likely 
to benefit the host society as a whole, and not just minority-refugees.  
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Nonetheless, the adoption of integration policies that simply respect the right of minority-
refugees to cultural identity is unlikely to be sufficient to guarantee social cohesion in 
host States. Integration, by definition, also entails the adaptation of the majority to the 
presence of newcomers.141 Specifically, active steps are required to ensure that the host 
society is open to cultural diversity and newcomers are not viewed as a threat.142 This is 
vital because research has connected threat perception on the part of the majority with an 
increase in prejudice, discrimination and intolerance towards newcomers,143 as well as 
intergroup anxiety.144 Threat perception reduces the willingness of the majority to interact 
with refugees and immigrants.145 Similarly, for minority-refugees, animosity may be 
reminiscent of persecution experienced in their home States and lead them to avoid 
contact with the host society.146 As interaction is a precondition of threat and prejudice 
reduction and social cohesion,147 host States must address threat perception in the design 
of integration policies. This is also important because if the majority holds negative 
attitudes and perceives that cultural groups pose a threat, it tends to oppose all policies 
that are perceived to benefit those groups.148 Most notably, in Europe, the perception that 
alien cultures pose a threat has led to increased opposition to the recognition of basic 
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migrant and refugee rights for those who are culturally different.149 Consequently, if steps 
are not take to counter threat perception in the host society, this has the potential to expose 
minority-refugees to a wide range of harms in the host State beyond the failure to 
recognise their right to cultural identity. 
 
Therefore, UN treaty bodies should encourage States to adopt measures to facilitate the 
adaptation of the host society to increased cultural diversity. From the perspective of 
social psychology, measures to increase knowledge of the other, combined with measures 
to increase interaction between members of different groups, with the aim of forging 
friendships, are central to such efforts.150 Significantly, UN Treaty Bodies have previously 
highlighted the need for States to adopt measures to promote tolerance, eliminate 
prejudice and counteract stereotypes in society.151 However, such recommendations tend 
to be vague, are not targeted specifically at minority-refugees and require further 
elaboration in relation to how States can achieve these objectives in practice.152  
 
The failure of UN treaty bodies to address minority-refugees’ right to cultural identity has 
the potential to undermine the social cohesion of host States, if host States take it as a 
green light to adopt assimilation as opposed to integration policies. However, social 
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cohesion and the acceptance of the right to cultural identity are mutually reinforcing. 
Consequently, UN treaty bodies must not only discourage States from trying to assimilate 
minority-refugees, but also emphasise the need for integration policies that actively 
facilitate the adaptation of the majority to the presence of minority-refugees, if minority-





This article has demonstrated that it is vital for UN treaty bodies to recognise and address 
the implications of intersectionality beyond the traditional categories of race, gender 
and/or disability, in their practice. By drawing on the hitherto unexplored intersection 
between the categories of persons belonging to minorities and refugees, it has revealed 
that failure to do so has consequences that reach further than the directly impacted 
individuals. Consequently, UN treaty bodies must adopt specific recommendations in 
their Concluding Observations pertaining to the distinct experiences of individuals 
belonging to intersecting social categories.  
 
We have shown that minority-refugees experience intersectional oppression as a result of 
the interaction between their status as persons belonging to minorities and refugees. 
Although they suffer from similar patterns of oppression to those typifying these 
categories, they also have a qualitatively different experience. Minority-refugees’ 
location at the intersection of two social categories specifically hampers their ability to 
preserve their cultural identity.  
 
As minority-refugees have frequently sought refuge in order to escape persecution 
connected to their minority identity, it is essential that their right to cultural identity is 




recognised in practice. However, UN treaty bodies tend to classify refugees as a 
homogenous group. While they do not exclude minority-refugees from the right to 
cultural identity, they also do not explicitly recognise that minority-refugees hold this 
right nor do they acknowledge how minority-refugees’ qualitatively different experience 
impacts the realisation of this right. Crucially, the current practice of UN treaty bodies 
has the potential to implicitly legitimise the adoption of assimilation policies by States. 
In so doing, UN treaty bodies participate in the oppression of minority-refugees. 
 
Assimilation policies run counter to minority-refugees’ right to preserve their cultural 
identity and, in so doing, have a number of negative implications not all of which are 
immediately obvious. Specifically, they undermine the dignity of minority-refugees, by 
limiting their options and inhibiting their participation in the host society. Assimilation 
policies, further, have the potential to compound the persecution experienced by 
minority-refugees in their home States and result in the complete destruction of their 
culture. Finally, assimilation policies also undermine social cohesion in host States by 
aggravating the host society’s threat perception and not requiring their adaptation. All of 
these implications are exacerbated by the intersectional nature of the oppression 
experienced by minority-refugees.  
 
Therefore, it is imperative that UN treaty bodies not only recognise that minority-
refugees’ right to cultural identity but that they also address minority-refugees’ distinct 
experience in their Concluding Observations. Specifically, UN treaty bodies must 
expressly prohibit the adoption of assimilation policies in relation to minority-refugees 
and instead require the adoption of integration polices. These policies should allow 
minority-refugees to preserve their cultural identity and also facilitate the mutual 
adaptation of minority-refugees and host societies alike. However, UN treaty bodies must 
also emphasise States’ positive obligation to facilitate the preservation of minority-




refugees’ cultural identity. For example, States could be encouraged to override ‘safe 
third country’ and dispersal policies and provide support for transnational networks and 
minority media. Failure to do so, has the potential to undermine the objectives of IHRL 
and IMRL, namely: the protection of human dignity; the preservation and continued 
existence of minority identities; and social stability and cohesion. 
 
Consequently, UN treaty bodies must adopt an intersectional lens to ensure that the needs 
of individuals who are rendered particularly vulnerable by intersecting systems of 
oppression are fully addressed in their monitoring practice. While they have sought to do 
so at the intersection of gender, race and/or disability, the significance of intersectionality 
must be acknowledged beyond these categories moving forward. Otherwise, UN treaty 
bodies risk participating in the oppression of individuals located at unrecognised 
intersections and may even undermine the ability of IHRL to achieve its overarching 
objectives.  
